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Situation I. Neutral Duties., the Passage of Belligerent
Warships in Neutral Territorial Waters., and the Right
of Belligerents to Use Force to Remedy Violation of
Neutrality.
The following hypothetical International Law Situation was
presented to the students of the Naval War College as a part
of one of their Operational Problems. See figure 1 for illustration
of the Situation.
THE SITUATION
State A and thirteen other states are members of the United
Nations and of a Defense Pact organized under Article 51 of the
Charter. States X, Y and Z, also members of the United Nations,
commenced without warning an armed attack on a member of
the Defense Pact. In the Security Council, the Defense Pact States
thereupon charged States X, Y and Z with aggression, but X, a
permanent member thereof, "vetoed" the resolution condemning
X, Y and Z as aggressors and calling for sanctions. The General
Assembly was then convened under the Uniting For Peace Resolution and passed, with a two-thirds majority, a resolution condemning the aggression and calling upon United Nations members
for voluntary assistance to the victims of the aggression. State U,
although a member of the United Nations, announced that she
would maintain a position of neutrality. Despite the General
Assembly resolution, X, Y and Z launched a major offensive.
Fighting had been in progress for some months and nuclear
weapons had been used, for tactical purposes, on both sides.
J, a member State of the Defense Pact, had been ocupied by
X, Y and Z in its northwest and northeast regions. The Defense
Pact States commenced an amphibious attack on the northwest
coast of J. X had assembled, in its port of Gr.anada, some 700
miles from J, special weapons personnel and equipment for use in
the northwestern part of J. The personnel and equipment were
embarked on the "Lost Charm" for New Paris, a northwestern J
port now in the hands of X. New Paris is near the area of
amphibious operations, and one of the objectives of the operations.
Instead of taking the usual and most direct route, X directed the
commander of the "Lost Charm," an auxiliary of X flying X's
service flag, to proceed through the X-coalition territorial waters
5
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and thence through U's territorial waters, to arrive at J's border
at nightfall, and thence to New Paris under cover of darkness.
This route was eight hundred miles longer than the direct route
from X's port of Granada to New Paris in J. The estimated time
required for the "Lost Charm" to traverse U's territorial waters
was 50 hours, in addition to the time required to transit the
X coalitio'n 's territorial waters. The excess time over the direct
route may be estimated at 80 hours.
The mission and location of the "Lost Charm" were discovered
by the Defense Pact's intelligence just after that ship had entered
the territorial waters of U. A's ambassador to U, on behalf of the
Defense Pact, immediately informed U's Foreign Office of these
facts and demanded that U either intern the "Lost Charm" or
order the "Lost Charm" out of U's territorial waters. U, relying
on the Altmark precedent in World War II, replied that it
would not comply with either request.
Problem:
a. Has U violated its duties as a neutral in refusing to comply
with A's demand on behalf of the Defense Pact?
b. Are the Defense Pact States entitled to use force against the
"Lost Charm" in U's territorial waters, if U is unable or unwilling to comply with A's demand, and should have done so?
Solution:
a. U has violated its duties as a neutral in permitting an
abusive use of its territorial waters that was not for bona fide
purposes of navigation and was prejudicial to the security interests
of the coastal state and to the interests of the Defense Pact as
opposing belligerents. Such use is not the "mere passage" authorized by Article X of Hague Convention XIII.
b. While every breach of neutral duties does not authorize
forceful counteraction by an aggrieved belligerent, in the case of
such a grave violation as the instant Situation presents, the
Defense Pact States were legally entitld to use force to prevent
irremediable injury arising from U's breach of neutrality.
NOTES
The Altmark Case

The hypothetical situation is of course essentially similar to
the Altmark case which took place in Norwegian territorial waters
in 1940. A general and readable account of the incident is The
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Altmark Affair, by Frischauer and Jackson (The Macmillan
Compa'ny, New York, 1955). The essential facts of that case were
briefly summarized in Hackworth, Digest of International Law,
Vol. VII, pp. 568-69, ( 1943), as follows:
"The German steamer, Altmark, previously a merchant tanker but at the time in question a naval auxiliary,
armed with anti-aircraft guns and flying the German
official service flag as a vessel used for public purposes, entered Norwegian territorial waters on February
14, 1940 with the intention of skirting the Norwegian
and Swedish coasts until she reached a German port.
She brought from the South Atlantic as prisoners 299
British seamen who had been taken from vessels sunk by
the German cruiser Admiral Graf Spee. Shortly after
entering Norwegian waters she was hailed by a Norwegian naval vessel which inspected her papers. At that
time the captain of the Altmark said that the ship was
on her way from Port Arthur, Texas, to Germany. The
next day another Norwegian naval vessel sought to inspect her but was refused the right. Among other questions, the captain of the Altmark was then asked whether
there were on board any persons belonging to the armed
forces of another belligerent or seamen resident in or
nationals of another belligerent country, and to these
he answered 'No'. At this time it was learned that the
Altmark had been using her wireless transmitter within
Norwegian waters, but the captain said that he was
unaware of any prohibition against this and thereupon
ceased doing so. A Norwegian torpedo boat was escorting
the Altmark, and a second joined them February 16. That
day British naval and air forces approached, and the
British commanding officer suggested that the Altmark
be taken under joint British and Norwegian escort to
Bergen for full examination, but the Norwegian commander refused. The Norwegian authorities apparently
remained unaware that prisoners were aboard the
Altmark. British destroyers which had entered Norwegian territorial waters retired upon the protest of
Norwegian officials but that 'night they forced the Altmark into Joesing Fjord. While the Norwegian torpedo
boats stood by, forces from the British destroyer Cossack
boarded the Altmark, which had gone aground in the
fjord., Fighting ensued in which seven Germans were
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killed or died of wounds and one British national was
wounded. The prisoners were rescued and taken aboard
the Cossack, and the British forces departed from Norwegian waters with the prisoners."
Comparison of Facts in Situation and Altmark Case

There are certain important differences between the facts of
the hypothetical situation and the Alt?nark incident. The transport of special weapons personnel and equipment is undoubtedlyof a less "innocent" character, and more likely to provoke belligerent counter-action than the transport of prisoners. Moreover,
with reference to question (b), the justification for the use of
force has a stronger factual foundation in this Situation. Furthermore, there is no question involved in the Situation as to the legal
status of captured merchant seamen. However, the avoidance by
the Altmark, en route from the South Atlantic to Germany, of
the English Channel and the British Isles by going via Icelandic
waters and then passing through Norwegian territorial waters
for over two days and more than 400 miles before the British
attack, and contemplating a further passage of 200 miles in those
waters was equally abnormal in route and duration. The basic
legal question as to the legality of the passage is, therefore, essentially unaffected by the factual differences.
Opinions of Writers on Altmark Case

The Altmark incident aroused controversy at the time, and discussion of it has continued among writers on international law.
Shortly after the incident occurred, the following opinion was
expressed in the Naval War College International Law Situations,
1939, pp. 14-15:
"The British Government and some international lawyers charged that Norway had failed in its duties and
that it should not have allowed the Alt/n~ark to transport
prisoners along its coast. More careful examination of
the situation, however, indicates that Norway had no
obligation to halt the Altmark, to force it to leave, to
intern it, or to release the prisoners."
Following this opinion, there appeared an extensive quotation
from the similar opinion of the late Professor Borchard of Yale
University which had appeared in full in 34 American Journal of
International Law at pages 289-294 (1940). The late Professor
Hyde, in the Second Revised Edition (1945) of his International
La~u, chiefly as interpreted and applied by the United States,
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concurred essentially in the same position. (Vol. III, p. 2340) .
Hackworth, Vol. VII, p. 575, concludes his treatment of the incident by quoting the opinion of the Naval War College, supra.
Among foreign writers, Castren in The Present Law of War and
Neutrality (Helsinki, 1954) discusses the question at pp. 515-517,
and expresses doubt as to the validity of the British arguments
in the rna tter.
British writers, on the other hand, have come to the defense
of the British position, particularly after the end of the war and
in light of the published views of the American writers noted
above. Dr. W. R. Bisschof, however, discussed the question before
the Grotius Society in 1940, and first raised in the literature the
issue of whether the Alt'mark's circuitous route and extended
trip through the Norwegian territorial waters was not an abuse
of neutrality and therefore not the "mere passage" permitted by
Article X of Hague Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (1907). ( (1940) 26
Grotius Society Transactions, p. 67 et seq.) In Oppenheim,
International Law, Vol. II (7th Ed., 1952, by Lauterpacht), the
position is taken that prolonged use by a belligerent of neutral
territorial waters for passage not dictated by the requirements of
navigation and intended to escape capture is an illicit use of
neutral territory which the neutral is under a duty to prevent
(pp. 692-695).
Without discussing the Altmark case in detail, Professor H. A.
Smith in The Law and Custom of the Sea (2nd Ed., 1950),
reached the same conclusion as a matter of general principle
(pp. 148-153, esp. p. 152, n. 5). Colombos, in The International
Law of the Sea (3rd Rev. Ed., 1954) reaches the same conclusion
in a summary manner (pp. 510-511). The most extensive discussion of the Altmark case and the most thorough exploration
of the legal issues involved is in Waldock, "The Release of the
Altmark's Prisoners," (1947), 24 British Year Book of International Law, pp. 216-238. Professor Waldock, Chichele Professor
of International Law and Diplomacy at Oxford, concludes that the
Altmark's passage was unlawful. The details of his argument
will be examined at a later stage. Professor Stone of Australia
in his Legal Controls of International Conflict (1954) expresses a
similar opinion although differing somewhat in the details of
his argument (pp. 394-5).
Professor Telders of Leyden, The Netherlands, in "L'Incident
de l' Altmark" (Revue Generale de droit international public, Vol.
48 (1941-5), pp. 90-100) reaches the same general conclusion but
his arguments differ substa'n tially from those previously referred

~~-statusStarting
with the view that the Altmark could not claim the 'I
of a warship but that Norway could have treated her as
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such for neurality purposes, Telders argues that there was no
time limit on passage in Norway's regulations and that Norway,
not having forbidden passage as it could have, had impliedly
permitted it. He contends, further, that Article XII of Hague
Convention XIII imposed no time limit, and that Article X
authorized passage for purposes of transit, which is not restricted
to 'necessary transit. Such passage is, moreover, not deprived
of its innocent character by the sole fact that a warship is using
the passage as an asylum as well. But he nonetheless concludes
that the legality of the Altmark's position does not turn on the
"passage" question because he argues that auxiliaries have no .
right to transport prisoners. Furthermore, whatever the immunity
of warships from search, he asserts that auxiliaries have no such
immunity. Therefore, he believes that Norway had a duty to search
the AltJn ark; that its failure to do so was a breach of neutral
duty; and that the British were justified on the basis of selfprotection in their exceptional intervention which did not exceed '
the limits of necessity.
In addition to "The Altmark Affair," referred to previously
as a good general account of the incident, the early official
statements made by the British, German, and Norwegian Governments may be found in Documents on International Affairs,
"Nor~vay and the War" (Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1941, pp. 33-38). In Norway, No. 1 (1950), Cmd. 8012, reprinted,
infra, as Appendix I to this Situation, a White Paper issued by
the British Foreign Office on August 15, 1950, the text of the final
British Note of 15 March 1940, which reached Oslo shortly before
the German invasion, was made available. This Note was the first
time that the British raised the question of the compatibility of
the passage with the privilege given by Article X of Hague Convention XIII. Cmd. 8012 includes the texts of other correspondence
between the two governments in the period between 17 February
and 15 March 1940. In the recently published International Law
Studies, 1955 (U.S. Naval War College, Vol. L, 1957), Professor
Tucker discusses the Altmark case in some detail and, in general,
agrees with the British position (221n, 236-239, 262n).
Provisions of Hague Convention XIII-Other Texts

Hague Convention XIII of 1907, Convention Concerning the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, is printed
in full in Naval War College, International La1v Situations, 1908,
at pp. 213-222, and in Appendix B to the Law of Naval Warfare
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(Navy Department, 1955) . The text may also be conveniently
found in 36 Stat. 2415, U.S.T.S. 545, and Malloy's Treaties, Vol.
II, p. 2352. The status of the Convention as of 31 October 1955
is given in State Department Publication No. 6346, page 203.
Provisions particularly relevant to the discussion of the Situation are the following:
ARTICLE I. "Belligerents are bound to respect the
sovereign rights of neutral Powers and to abstain, in
neutral territory or neutral waters, from all acts which
would constitute, on the part of the neutral Powers,
which knowingly permitted them, a non-fulfillment of
their neutrality.
ARTICLE II. "All acts of hostility, including capture
and the exercise of the right of visit and search, committed by belligerent vessels of war in the territorial
waters of a neutral Power, constitute a violation of
neutrality and are strictly forbidden.
ARTICLE V. "Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations against
their adversaries, and in particular to erect wireless
telegraph stations or a'n y apparatus for the purpose of
communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea.
ARTICLE X. "The neutrality of a Power is not affected by the mere passage through its territorial waters
of ships of war or prizes belonging to belligerents.
ARTICLE XII. "In the absence of special provisions
to the contrary in the legislation of the neutral Power,
belligerent ships of war are forbidden to remain in the
ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said
Power for more than twenty-four hours, except in the
cases covered by the present Convention.
ARTICLE' XIII. "If a Power which has been informed
of the outbreak of hostilities learns that a belligerent
ship of war is in one of its ports or roadsteads, or in
its territorial waters it must notify the said ship to
depart within twenty-four hours or within· the time
prescribed by the local regulations.
ARTICLE XXV. "A neutral Power is bound to exercise
such .surveillance as the means at its disposal allow to
prevent any violation of the provisions of the above
Articles in its ports or roadsteads, or in its waters."
Although the Convention was not technically in force in World
War II because certain of the belligerents, including the United
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Kingdom, were not parties (see Article XXVIII), it has been
generally recognized that the provisons of the Convention as a ;
whole constituted an expression of binding customary international law on the subject. II Oppenheim, supra, pp. 234-236, 694 '
n. 1; Law of Naval Warfare, supra, Ch. 2, n. 7, and Ch. 4, n. 18;
Stone, supra, p. 391, n. 62. Before discussing the critical questions of interpretation that arise out of the ambiguities of the
relevant provisions of the Convention, reference may be made
to comparable statements of the applicable law. The Harvard
Draft Convention o'n Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval
and Aerial War provides in Article 25 as follows:
"A neutral State has no duty to prevent the passage of
a belligerent warship through its territorial waters."
(American Jou;rnal of International Law, Vol. XXXIII,
Supplement, Part II, p. 179, and Comment, p. 421
(1939)). [Quoted with the permission of the Harvard
Law School.]
In the Comment that follows at page 422, citation above, this
wording is said to embody the substance of Article X of Hague
Convention XIII and it is asserted to be a statement of the
international law on the subject in force at that time.
Law of Naval Warfare (Department of the Navy, 1955), provides as follows in Section 443a:
"a. Passage Through Territorial Sea. A neutral state
may allow the mere passage of warships, or prizes, of
belligerents through its territorial sea. 22 "
Interpretative Footnote 22 to Section 443 reads in part as
follows:

"* * * Thus, the 'mere passage' that may be granted
to belligerent warships through neutral territorial waters
must be of an innocent nature, in the sense that it must
be incidental to the normal requirements of navigation
and not intended in any way to turn neutral waters into
a base of operations. In particular, the prolonged use of
neutral waters by a belligerent warship either for the
purpose of avoiding combat with the enemy or for the
purpose of evading capture, would appear to fall within
the prohibition against using neutral waters as a base
of operations. * * *"
The International Law Commission's final Report on the Law
of the Sea 7 adopted at its Eighth Session (1956), deals with the
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right of Innocent Passage in Part I, Section III. The Report is
reprinted in full, infra, Part II, Section 11,A,2. Although the
International Law Commission's work is devoted to the law of
the sea in time of peace, their formulations on this subject are
valuable for the wartime situation as well, in view of the close
connection between the wartime rules and the rules in peacetime, and the relevance of the peacetime standard to the interpretation of Article X, discussed, infra.
Article 15, paragraph 3, defines innocent passage as follows:
"3. Passage is innocent so long as the ship does not use
the territorial sea for committing any acts prejudicial to
the security of the coastal State or contrary to the present rules, or to other rules of international law."
Article 16, paragraph 1, in defining the duties of the coastal
State, states that it "must not allow the said sea to be used for
acts contrary to the rights of other States." In Article 17, defining
the rights of protection of the coastal State, paragraph 1 authorizes
said State "to protect itself against any act prejudicial to its
security or to such other of its interests as it is authorized to
protect under the present rules and other rules of international
law." Paragraph 3 authorizes the coastal State to suspend passage
temporarily in definite areas if essential for protection of the
rights in paragraph 1. Paragraph 4 forbids suspension of passage
through straits "normally used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas." Article 18 defines the duties
of foreign ships during their passage. Articles 15, 16, 17, and
18 apply to ALL vessels.
Articles 24 and 25 are applicable to warships. Article 24 reads
as follows:
"1. The coastal State may make the passage of warships through the territorial sea subject to previous authorization or notification. Normally it shall grant innocent passage subject to the observance of the provisions
of articles 17 and 18."
Article 25 authorizes the coastal State to require warships, not
observing its regulations after request to do so, to leave the
territorial sea.
In addition to the various texts referred to above, a high judicial interpretation of the meaning of innocent passage in a
different context is of interest as a basis for comparison.
In the Corfu Channel case (Merits) (International Court of
Justice Reports, 19491 pp. 4-38), the Court held that ·warships
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have a right of "innocent passage" in time of peace through
straits used for international navigation (p. 28). The Court was ·
also of the opinion that the straits did not have to be a necessary ;
route 'but merely one used for international navigation. Although
the passage of British warships through the Corfu Channel was
also designed to test the Albanian attitude in view of a previous
illegal firing by Albania, and to demonstrate force, the Court
held that, under all the circumstances, the "mission," and the
1nanner of carrying it out did not deprive the passage of its
innocent character (pp. 30-32). (The Judgment of the Court is
reprinted in Naval War College, International Law Documents,
1948-49, pp. 108-156. The points discussed are to be found at
pages 142-148).
"Mere Passage"

The principal legal issue that arises in question (a) of the
Situation is whether the duration, route and mission of the "Lost
Charm" can be co'n sidered "mere passage" through U's territorial waters, or an abuse of this privilege. This inquiry in turn
requires the interpretation of Hague Convention XIII, and
particularly Article X thereof. In the Altmark case, the early
discussion by the Governments involved and the writers as well,
\Vas largely directed to the right to search the Altmark and the
lawfulness of transporting the prisoners. The British Note of '
15 March 1940, reprinted in Appendix I, infra, first published
in 1950, and the British writers previously referred to, emphasized the "mere passage" question. Consequently, the discussion
of the Situation will necessarily consider the arguments advanced
on this aspect of the Altmark case.
Article X taken alone is ambiguous. It becomes even more so
when read in the light of the Hague Convention XIII as a
whole. On the one hand, the Convention is designed to prohibit
belligerent activities of a hostile nature in neutral ports and
waters. On the other hand, there are numerous exceptions which
permit belligerents to use neutral ports and waters as an asylum.
Furthermore, several of the provisions give the neutral great di$cretion in defining its obligations under the Convention.
The general principle is clear : that belligerents are bound to
refrain from acts of hostility in neutral territory. What has been
persistently troublesome, however, is the precise scope of the
subsidiary principle expressed in Article V that neutral ports and
waters shall not be used as a base of naval operations. Practice '
in the nineteenth century never resolved this problem and the ~
provisions of Hague Convention XIII did not succeed in formulat-
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ing an agreed and authoritative interpretation of this principle.
See, for discussion, Hyde, supra, Vol. III, pp. 2249-2253 ; Stone,
supra, pp. 392-395.
Neutrals are obligated to deny any privilege of passage' to belligerents over the land territory or through the airspace of a
neutral. It is now generally agreed that a neutral may, if it chooses,
forbid passage through its territorial waters as well. See Jessup,
Th1e Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurdisdiction, pages
120-121; Law of Naval Warfare, supra, Ch. 4, n. 22; Stone, supra,
p. 395; II Oppenheim, supra, p. 693. When Hague Convention
XIII was drafted, however, there was no such general agreement
that a neutral could forbid passage through territorial waters.
Many States argued that there was such a rule. The British insisted that there was a RIGHT of innoce'n t passage. The British
Delegation to the 1907 Hague Conference was the original proposer
of the substance of Article X, and seemed to view "mere passage"
as meaning innocent or inoffensive passage in the interests of
normal navigation as in peacetime. Article X, as adopted, was
in essence a formula for leaving this controversy in an unsettled
status. By not adopting the rule of complete exclusion, the neutral
was given the option of permitting "mere passage'' in the interests
of navigation rather than enforcing strict neutrality as neutrals
are obligated to do under the land and air rules. See A. P. Higgins,
The Hague Peace Conferences (1909), pp. 467-468.
It is assumed for present purposes that State U has made no
regulations on the subject with respect to either Article X or XII.
The most reasonable interpretation of the Hague Convention as a
statement of customary international law is thus the principal
issue. Although, as stated, Article X is ambiguous in itself, it is
first necessary to discuss the ambiguities in the relation of Article
X to other Articles of the Convention. Article V forbids the use
of neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations by
belligerents against their adversaries. Article XII provides that
in the absence of special legislation by the neutral, as assumed in
this Situation, belligerent warships are not permitted "to remain
in" the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters for more than
twenty-four hours, "except in the cases covered by the present
Convention." What is the relation of these Articles to Article X,
which, in substance, states that a Power's neutrality is not compromised by the "mere passage" ("simple passage" in the French
Text) of warships through its territorial waters?
Waldock, supra, at page 235, argues that "passage" is covered
by the twenty-four hour rule of Article XII; that a circuitous
route to evade attack was not "mere passage" within Article X
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but the use of the neutral waters for naval operations contrary
to Article V, or alternatively, if Article V was not violated, use
for refuge was not "mere passage" within Article X, and therefore passage is restricted to twenty-four hours by Article XII.
These summarized conclusions of Professor Waldock do not do
justice to his detailed argument, which may be briefly stated as
follows: The Norwegian Neutrality Rules of 1938 (Vol. 32,
American Journal of International Law, Supplement, 1938, pp.
154-158) purport to restate the Hague rules. Although they dQ
not refer specifically to the duration of passage, they could not
enlarge Article X which is customary international law. Article
X, being silent, leaves the time question open. The question under
Article XII is whether "remain" confines the twenty-four hour
rule to stops or applies to every entry. Article XIII strengthens the
argument for the twenty-four hour rule. There is no support for
more than twenty-four hours in Norway's regulations, nor for i
Norway's distinction between passage after a stop and passage
without a stop. The Pan-American General Declaration of Neutrality of 1939 said that belligerent warships may remain no more
than twenty-four hours in ports and waters with no mention of
passage (34 American Journal of International Law, Supplement, 1940, p. 10). The United States Proclamation of 5 September
1939 (Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1939, p.
123) made no exception for passage and the special rules for the
Canal Zone (Ibid., p. 139) make this position even clearer. Despite
British championship of innocent passage, her 1912 regulations
adopted the twenty-four hour rule with no mention of passage.
Therefore, Norway's contention of no time limit is doubtful and
contrary to the natural meaning of the Convention and tha regulations and interpretations of states.
Moreover, Waldock's argument continues, whatever the time
limit, passage is restricted to "mere passage," which means liberty
of transit incident to normal navigation, and for that purpose and
not to gain an advantage. Any other view invites abuse and provokes hostilities. An abnormal course of extended duration is not
"innoce'n t." The use of Norway's waters as a protected corridor
is the use as a base of operations contrary to Article V. Article
XII admittedly permits asylum under the twenty-four hour rule '
but is inconsistent with modern standards of neutral duty, and
the trend in the practice of states is to restrict asylum, citing ;
Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1939, p. 44, on
treatment of warships AFTER entry. Even though Article XII
was still valid in 1940 as a statement of customary law, it is not '
the same as indefinite passage through territorial waters, and .
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abnormal passage is not permitted by Article X. The use of
Norway's territorial waters as a protected corridor vvas an issue
in World War I. Norway closed her waters to submarines in 1916.
Both Great Britain and the United States protested alleged violations of this prohibition and urged Norway to mine her waters,
which she did in 1918. Therefore, Norway knew of these views
concerning the use of her territorial waters as a protected corridor.
Professor W aldock then concludes as summarized, supra.
Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra, pp. 694-5 and 694, footnote 1,
argues that the permission of passage is limited by the overriding
principle of preventing neutral waters from becoming a base for
belligerents, and that a circuitous route not required by normal
navigation and used as a means of escape is illicit. It is asserted
that the provisions under reference can be reconciled by treating
Article X as permitting passage beyond the twenty-four hours of
Article XII, so long as the passage does not contravene Article V
by turning the waters into a base of operations. Bisschof, supra,
on the other hand, like W aldock, regards Article XII as setting a
twenty-four hour limit to any passage under Article X. Professor
Stone, supra, pp. 394-5, follows Lauterpacht's Oppenheim on this
question but would require more in the way of circuity and degree
of abuse. Neither Hyde nor Borchard, supra, really discuss this
issue. Smith, supra, p. 152, Note 5, regards the question of whether
passage under Article X is subject to the twenty-four hour rule
of Article XII as debatable, and believes it is probably up to the
neutral to define the time limit under its power to do so granted
in Article XII. Castren, supra, recognizes the question of interpretation as doubtful but is inclined to regard Article XII as
imposing no time limit on passage under Article X.
Telders, supra, considers that neither Article XII nor the Convention as a whole impose any time limit on passage but does not
discuss the bearing of Article V on the question. The British Note
of 15 March 1940, Appendix I, infra, takes the position that
Article X does not incorporate the 24-hour limit of Article XII
but that Article X governs the time limit indirectly by the nature
of the innocent passage which it permits. Furthermore, the Note
contends that, although Article XII is not controlling as to time,
it serves to refute any contention that no time limit exists since
it applies also to territorial waters subject to the innocent passage
permitted by Article X. Finally, as noted supra, the La~v of Naval
Warfare in its interpretative footnote 22 treats Article X as
· modified by the prohibition of Article V. Interpretative footnote
23 treats the question of whether the 24-hour rule of Article XII
limits the duration of passage under Article X as unsettled but
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expresses the op1n1on that, if it does not, then passage under
Article X must be limited to the normal requirements of navigation.
While] admittedly, the interpretation of the relationship between
Articles V, X and XII in the light of the Convention as a whole is
controversial, it is believed that the most reasonable interpretation
is to regard "mere passage" under Article X as NOT limited by the
24-hour rule of Article XII. However, the presence and wording
of Article XII help to give meaning to the privilege of "merepassage" in Article X, as discussed hereafter. Furthermore, the
most probable interpretation of Article X, suggested infra, qualifies the privilege of passage given thereby. Finally, "mere passage"
in Article X must also be restricted by the prohibitions of Article
V against using territorial waters as a base of naval operations
and by the generalized restrictions of Articles I and II and the
Convention as a whole against using neutral territory for hostilities.
With. this interpretation of the relationship between the Articles,
we now turn to a more detailed discussion of the meaning of
"mere passage" in Article X. What has been said so far suggests
that Article X can only be considered in the context of the Convention as a whole. It has already been indicated that Article X
was a formula that left previous differences of opinion unsettled.
It was a compromise in that sense between the view that neutrals
could exclude passage altogether, and the British view that there
was a RIGHT of innocent passage for warships in wartime similar
to the peacetime right of merchant vessels.
"Mere passage" in Article X can not be given a precise textual
meaning. The legislative history provides no conclusive interpretation. The use of the qualifying word "mere" indicates some
limitation on passage was intended. The British who introduced
the phrase into their draft of the Article indicated that innocent
passage in the peacetime sense was what they had in mind. Any
meaning given to the phrase is necessarily an interpretation. What
is the most reasonable one in the light of its history and t4e
purpose it was inte·n ded to serve? Treating the question as one of
defining what is meant by "innocent passage" in the peacetime
sense is a .step in the interpretation of "mere passage."
The introduction of "innocent passage" in the peacetime sense
as an analogy for use in interpretation is fundamentally ambiguous. It can not be transferred literally into the wartime situation. The wartime trilateral relations between opposing belligerents and a neutral coastal state are essentially different
in kind and degree from the bilateral relations of a flag-state
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and a coastal state in peacetrme. Nevertheless, the peacetime
analogy serves to indicate the type of passage that belligerents
were willing to allow neutrals to grant. The type of passage contemplated is limited by two basic criteria. It must be an innocent
passage for bona fide purposes of navigation rather than for
escape or asylum. The passage must also be innocent in the sense
that it does not prejudice either the security interests of the
coastal state, or the interests of the opposing belligerent in preventing passage beyond the type agreed to in Article X. A passage
that increased the burden of surveillance or the likelihood of embroiling the neutral in hostilities would certainly prejudice the
security interests of the neutral coastal state. Any passage that
was prejudicial to other legitimate interests of the coastal state
would warrant action by the coastal state but the coastal state
would be under no duty since the additional interest of the opposing belligerent would not be involved. By virtue of these suggested requirements, the belligerents are entitled to have passage
so confined, and the neutral is under a duty to so limit the
privilege.
Such an interpretation is essentially in accord with the views
of Lauterpacht, Stone, and Waldock. Lauterpacht's Oppenheim,
supra, II, p. 694, n. 1, and p. 695 ; Stone, supra, pp. 394-5, and n.
83,p.394;Waldock,supra,pp.232-235.
The first of these criteria, that of passage for bona fide navigational purposes, presents difficulties in itself. Suggestions that it
means "normal" navigation practices raise problems as to the
sense in which "normal" is used. Abnormal routes may still be
bona fide ones. Nevertheless, extremely circuitous routes suggest
possible bad faith. Moreover, motivations of escape or asylum
make clear the purpose is not for navigation.
With respect to the second criterion, it is believed that a passage
by a belligerent that imposes special burdens of surveillance on
the neutral and increases the likelihood of involving the neutral
in hostilities with the opposing belligerent could not be "innocent"
because it is prejudicial both to the security interests of the coastal
state and to the interests of the opposing belligerent. This
criterion would certainly encompass the use of neutral territorial
waters as a protected corridor for purposes of avoiding capture
or attack. Such a use might not reach the extent of employing
such waters as a base for naval operations within the meaning
of Article V, which certainly provides the outer limit to the reasonableness of the passage. In view of the ambiguity of Article
V's prohibition against use as a base of naval operations referred
to, supra, and the consequent doubt vvhether use as an asylum is
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included in that prohibition, the interpretation .suggested for
"mere passage" in Article X gives it a meaning consistent with
the Convention as a whole. Article XII permits a twenty-four
hour "stay," including use as an asylum, but, as previously indicated, it imposes no direct time limit on passage. Article X,
while having no time limit, confers a special but limited privilege
of passage by confinng it to a passage for bona fide navigational
purposes and one that is also innocent in not being prejudicial to
the security interests of the coastal state or the interests of the op..:
posing belligerent. Article V applies to both "stay" and "passage"
and prohibits either if it reaches the point of use as a base for
naval operations.
It seems most likely, therefore, that "innocent passage" in
peacetime of territorial waters as an international highway was
intended as a standard in the sense indicated above. What effect
does the duration of the passage have on its legality? It has already
been stated that the twenty-four hour rule of Article XII is not
believed to be a direct legal limitation. There would seem to be
no maximum time limit provided that the passage itself is "innocent." Duration beyond twenty-four hours is relevant only in
its bearing on the question of whether the passage is ''innocent."
In the light of this interpretation of "passage" in Article X,
does the "mission" of the ship furnish a further qualification of
this limited privilege? It was strongly argued in the Altmark case ·
that there was nothing wrongful per se in transporting prisoners.
Whatever the merit of this co·ntention, it would be unwarranted
to claim that the nature of the "mission'' has no bearing on the
innocence of the passage. If the "mission" by its nature is prejudicial to the security interests of the coastal state or the interests
of the opposing belligerent, either by increasing the burden of
surveillance or by increasing the likelihood of hostilities, it would
be another relevant factor in making that determination. A
fortiori, if the "mission" by its nature makes use of the waters
as a base of naval operations, it would be a violation of Article V
as well as Article X.
Application to the Present Situation

The route, purpose, and mission of the "Lost Charm'' were not
for purposes of bona fide navigation and were clearly prejudicial
to the security interests of U, the neutral and coastal state, and
to the interests of the Defense Pact as opposing belligerents. The
lo·n ger duration of the voyage, and the abnormality of the route,
while neither would be decisive in itself, were relevant to the
total assessment of the character of the passage. The "mission" ,
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was so clearly provocative and so obviously a military function
that it constituted by itself a violation of Article V, and therefore
exceeded without question the limited privilege of ''innocent"
passage given by Article V. The passage was designed to make
use of U's territorial waters as a shelter for naval operations.
Passage in circumstances so overwhelming in their impact as
these are should not be considered as the "mere passage" permitted
by Arti~le X. Such a passage is a flagrant abuse of U's neutrality.
By permitting such a pasage, U violated its duties as a neutral.
Application to the Altmark Case

The factual differences in the Altmark case have been noted,
supra. Admittedly, the ''mission" was less provocative. The abnormal route and the duration of the use of Norwegian territorial
waters would not in themselves be decisive. It is debatable whether
the total circumstances can be regarded as the use of the waters as
a base for naval operations within Article V, in the light of the
ambiguous history of that provision. It was, however, the use of
Norway's territorial waters as a means of escape and protection.
The passage, considered in its entirety, constituted an employment
of the neutral's territorial waters in a manner that was prejudicial to the security interests of the coastal state and the interests of the opposing belligerent. It increased the burden of
surveillance and the likelihood of counteraction. Such a passage
must be regarded as an abuse of Norway's neutrality, and can
not be justified by the limited privilege of ''mere passage" given
by Article X of Hague Convention XIII.
Right of Search

The present Situation does not require a discussion of the
prisoner question which was an issue in the Altmark case and
which was thoroughly debated by many of the writers cited previously. Although the search issue is not directly raised by the
facts given in question (a) of the Situation, the right of the
neutral to make a search was also thoroughly argued in the
Altmark case, and is implicit in the Situation. Both Borchard and
Hyde, supra, argued that there was no right to search a public
ship such as the Altmark, except possibly to see if there was compliance with Norway's neutrality regulations (Borchard). Telders,
supra, on the other hand, argued that an auxiliary such as the
Altmark was not immune from .search. Assuming, arguendo, that
there is normally immunity from search, the position of Waldock
(supra, pp. 221-222), that the neutral's duty to enforce its obligations under the Convention consitutes an exception to this im-
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munity, is more consistent with the spirit of the Convention, a'n d
a more workable rule if neutrality is to be preserved. Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra, (p. 730, n. 4), concedes that Norway
had no duty to search for the prisoners in order to release them,
but argues that search would be relevant in determining whether
the passage was "innocent," and therefore impliedly supports
Waldock's position. The British Government Note of 15 March
1940, reprinted, infra, Appendix I, argued vigorously that Norway
had an obligation to determine whether the passage was lawful,
and that failure to make a search for this purpose was a violation
of neutrality.
State U as a Neutral Mentb er of the United Nations

U, although a Member of the United Nations, declared her
intention to be neutral. Despite the inconsistency between the
collective security scheme of the Charter and traditional neutrality, it has been asserted that a status of neutrality for a Member
on the facts of this Situation is technically possible. It has been
factually possible, as Korea demonstrated. It is debatable whether
it is legally possible in view of the obligation of Members under :
Article 2 ( 5) that:
"All Members shall give the Unted Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the
present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance
to any state against which the United Nations is taking
preventive or enforcement action."

The "veto" prevented the United Nations from taking "action"
in accordance with the original Charter scheme, and the recommendations of the General Assembly, although morally persuasive,
cannot be deemed legally binding even on Members. Consequently,
it is permissible to contend that U was legally free to take the
position she did. It is believed, however, that she would have been
also legally justified if she had complied voluntarily with the recommendations. She had an imperfect right under Article 2 ( 5) '
to assist the collective action as well as the obligation not to give
assistance to the States opposing the collective action. The right
was "imperfect" in the sense that U and the Defense Pact's resort
to force had not been authoritatively determined to be lawful by
competent international authority.
The writers generally are in accord with this position. The Law
of Naval W a;rfare, supra, in Section 232, deals with the question
and reads in part as follows :
"Section 232.

* * * *

These obligations of the mem-
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her states, incompatible with the status of neutrality and
with the principle of impartiality, come into existence
only if the Security Council fulfills the functions delegated to it by the Charter. If the Security Council is
unable to fulfill its assigned functions, the members may,
in case of a war, remain neutral and observe an attitude
of strict impartiality. 19 "
In footnote 19, the opinion is expressed that the recommendations of the Generaly Assembly are not legally binding and therefore "neutrality and complete in1partiality both remain distinct
possibilities."
Stone in Legal Controls of International Conflict, supra, passim,
reaches this conclusion and asserts that the non-participating
Members in the Korean situation were neutrals (p. 382, n. 14).
Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra, pp. 647-652, reaches the same
general conclusion, although believing that a men1ber in U's position would have the right to discriminate against the aggressor.
Lalive in "International Organization and Neutrality", (1947),
24 British Year Book of International Law 72 at 77-84, discusses
this possibility in a number of situations under the Charter, and
concurs in the position taken above. Compare Taubenfeld in "International Actions and Neutrality" (1953), 47 American Journal
of International La~v 377-396, where the Korean situation is discussed, and the conclusion reached that neutrality is not legally
tenable for a Iviember in· a "true" United Nations action (pp.
390-395). Castren, supra, pp. 433-5, believes that a status of
neutrality for a Member is possible despite Section 2 ( 5) of the
Charter.
Use of Force by a Belligerent to Redress Abuse of Neutrality

It will now be assumed that the X-coalition's employment of the
"Lost Charm" was a violation of U's neutrality and that U was
obligated to either intern the "Lost Charm" or order it out of her
territorial waters. Question (b) of the Situation raises the issue
of whether the Defense Pact was entitled to use force in U's
territorial waters to redress the breach of neutrality if U was
unable or unwilling to do so. Since the facts of the Situation show
that U, relying on the Altmark precedent, refused to comply with
, the Defense Pact's request, the question of the Defense Pact's
right to employ force against the ''Lost Charm" is directly raised.
Article XXV of the Hague Convention, quoted supra, provides
that a neutral is bound to exercise such surveillance "as the means
at its disposal allow" to prevent violations of the Convention in
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its waters. Articles III, VIII, and XXI, in referring to neutral
duties of enforcement, also use the phrase ''as the means at its
disposal allow" in defining the obligation.
The facts stated in the Situation show a refusal to act, and do
not therefore pose directly the issue of the use of force by a belligerent when the neutral is willing but unable to act for lack of
adequate means at its disposal. Under these latter circumstances,
there is no violation of neutral duty. Nevertheless, despite that
fact and the quoted language of the Convention, the writers gen:erally take the view that the injured belligerent, under sufficiently
extreme circumstances, is authorized to use force to prevent
irremediable injury to itself. The belligerent's obligation not to
take hostile measures in neutral waters is inapplicable in extreme
cases not only when the neutral is unwilling to act but also when
it is unable to do so.
When, however, as in the Situation, the neutral is unwilling to i
act even though able to do so, the neutral has breached its duty
both under the Convention and under the general principles of
customary international law. Here, too, under sufficiently extreme
circumstances, the injured belligerent is authorized to use force
to prevent irremediable injury to itself. The injured belligerent's
normal remedy for such a breach of duty is to claim reparation
through diplomatic channels. For anything less than a grave
breach of duty, this is the only authorized remedy. The writers
also agree, however, that the belligerent is justified in resorting
to self-help under sufficiently extreme circumstances in which immediate cessation of the violation would be the only adequate
remedy. Whether the resort to self-help was justified will depend
both on the importance of the interests involved and the factual ·
necessity for immediate action if irreparable injury is to be :.
avoided.
The Law of Naval Warfare, supra, after referring to the prohibition of acts of hostility in neutral jurisdiction, goes on to
provide as follows:
"Section 441. * * * However, a belligerent is not forbidden to resort to acts of hostility in neutral jurisdiction
against enemy troops, vessels, or aircraft making illegal
use of neutral territory, waters, or air space, if a neutral
state will not or cannot effectively enforce its rights
against such offending belligerent forces. 21 "
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In footnote 21, the opinion is expressed that, despite the language of Article XXV of the Hague Convention, it is recognized
that a belligerent has the right, as an extreme measure, to use
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force against an enemy making illegal use of neutral territory,
when the neutral is unable or unwilling to do so.
Hyde, supra, although believing that the British were not justified in using force in the Altmark case, affirms that in extraordinary circumstances the belligerent is justified in using force
when the neutral is unable or unwilling to do so (Vol. III, pp.
2337-2340). W aldock, supra, in defending the British action in
the Altmark case, takes the position that any breach materially
threatening the injured belligerent's interest is by its nature so
serious that the principle of self-preservation justifies intervention
in neutral waters, and that such right of intervention is now
generally recognized, citing Hyde, supra. This right only accrues
when the neutral is unable or unwilling to prevent the violation,
citing Article XXV, supra.
Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supr~a, in supporting the British
action in the Altmark case, argues that in circumstances where
reparation would be inadequate, resort to self-help is justified
(Vol. II, p. 695, n. 1). Stone, supra, (p. 401 and note 117, p. 401)
differs from Lauterpacht and Waldock. He argues that only in case
of self,..preservation would self-help be justified, and does not believe that self-preservation was involved in the Altmark case, citing
the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu
Channel case. In the Corfu Channel case (Merits), (1949), International Court of Justice Reports, pp .34-5, the Court held that intervention for the purpose of procuring evidence of violation of
duty was an illegal use of force and that self-protection or self-help
did not justify the action of the British Navy in the circumstances
(Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1948-49, pp.
151-152). Castren, supra, affirms the right of the injured belligere'n t to resort to self-help when the situation is serious, and the
neutral is unable or unwilling to act ( p. 442). Telders, supra, argues that the British, not exceeding the limits of necessity, were
fully justified in the Altmark case under international law, and
supported not only by writers in general but by German doctrine as
vvell (pp. 98-99).
There is some dissent from this position. See Briggs, ·The Law
of Nations (2nd Ed., 1952), p. 1039, and compare the Harvard
Research Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States
in Naval and Aerial War, 33 American Journal of International
Law, Supp., 1939, Articles 6, 8, 23, and 24, and comments at pages
247-249, 257-263 and 392-421.
The question should be noted whether self-help in this Situation
by the injured belligerents, being Members of the United Nations,
would constitute a violation of the Charter in view of Article 2,
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paragraphs 3 and 4, and Article 51, which preserves the "inherent"
right of self-defense. Paragraph 3 requires Members to settle their
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international ;
peace is not endangered. Paragraph 4 reads as follows:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."
Full discussion of this important issue will not be attempted
here. In brief, it is believed that the use of force in the extreme
circumstances of the Situation would still be justified as a measure
of self-defense. In borderline situations, however, such as the
Altmark, if the Charter had thus been applicable, the use of force
might be prohibited by the mandate of Article 2, paragraph 4.
Consequently, to some extent, the neutral's territory in a future
war may theoretically receive additional protection from this
Charter provision. For further discussion, see W aldock, "The
Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law," Recueil des Cours, 1952, Vol. II, pp. 455-517, in
which he considers the impact of the Corfu Channel case as well
as the provisions of the U. N. Charter on the lawful use of force
by individual states in international law.
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Application to Present Situation

It has been seen that there is a general consensus that an in- .
jured belligerent has the right to resort to self-help if the circum- •
stances are sufficiently serious and the neutral is unable or :
unwilling to intervene to redress the breach of neutrality. The
presence of special weapons personnel and equipment on the "Lost
Charm" with their proximity to an area of operations made
immediate action imperative, and the normal diplomatic remedies
useless. Since U had refused to act, the Defense Pact forces would
be fully justified under international law and under the Charter
in using force to stop the X-coalition's abuse of U's neutrality.
The fact that the Defense Pact States were acting under a General
Assembly Resolution, even though not legally binding, provides
additional support.
Application to Alt1nark Case

On the facts of the Altmark case, the right of self-help pre- :
sents a debatable question. As indicated previously, the writers
have divided on the merits of the British intervention. Assuming .
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for the purpose of this aspect of the case that Norway had
violated its duties as a neutral, the legality of the British intervention turns on whether the breach of neutrality was sufficiently
serious to justify this extreme measure. Diplomatic redress would
certainly have been inadequate under the circumstances. If Stone
is correct that self-preservation is required, then intervention
would not be justified. In view of the weaknesses of international
society in providing adequate means for redressing wrongs, a
rule permitting intervention on the ground of self-help on the
facts in the Altm.ark case might be justified. Such a rule would
be more in accord with the realities and more likely to insure the
survival of the rules of neutrality. On the other hand, resort to
self-help should be confined to the gravest circumstances. On moral
and humanitarian grounds, the British intervention can be understood and defended. It is difficult to say dogmatically that their
intervention violated the law in force at the time. The thrust of
the Charter provisions and the Corfu Channel case, however, suggest that the use of force under such circumstances would no\v
be illegal. In view of the weaknesses of international institutions
previously mentioned, it may still be questioned whether such a
conclusion is desirable.
Student Comments

The small student staff assigned to study and comment on the
Situation concluded that the passage of the "Lost Charm" was not
innocent and that self-preservation and self-help justified the use
of force to end the violation of U's neutrality. The warlike nature
of the "mission" was emphasized. The view was expressed that
Hague Convention XIII needs reexamination in the light of
modern weapons systems, which make necessary stricter measures
to curb the advantages which may accrue to a belligerent in
neutral waters. The right of self-preservation is more immediately
involved. The passage of warships carrying materiel and personnel to a combat zone cannot be "innocent" and the neutral
should be obligated to prohibit such transit if neutrality is to be
preserved.
·
Adequacy of Convention XIII

As suggested by the student staff comments, the Situation raises
the question of the adequacy of I-Iague Convention XIII. Drawn
up as it was in a period of comparative calm, and before the
widespread violations of neutrality in the last two World Wars,
it is inevitable that its provisions are no longer adequate for
the conditions of modern warfare. Stone, supra, has dealt at
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length with the contemporary crisis of neutrality and has stressed,
inter alia, the effect of the inability of neutrals to live up to their
duties (Passim, and especially on Hague Convention XIII, pp.
391-396, and Discourse 23, pp. 402-407). Professor Hyde argued
convincingly the inadequacy of proclaiming the inviolability of
neutral territory and then permitting belligerent uses thereof
which inevitably inspired warlike activities therein. He suggested,
therefore, that passage through neutral coastal waters "should, by
general agreement, be greatly restricted, if not entirely forbid~
den" (Vol. III, p. 2312).
Professor H. A. Smith, supra, suggests in general terms that
neutrality as presently constituted is unlikely to survive in any
great conflict involving most of the world but that it may continue
to serve its traditional purpose in small wars (pp. 75-76). He
points out that the survival of neutrality even under these circumstances will depend on the strictness with which it is observed. He argues that the chances of such survival would be
greatly enhanced if a general policy of exclusion by neutrals of
belligerent warships from their territorial waters were followed,
as the Nether lands did in World War I. Consequently, sound
policy should restrict as much as possible the facilities which
belligerents can claim in neutral ports and waters. The right of
"innocent passage" in this context is anomalous. He concludes
that exclusion would be acceptable to belligerents, if territorial
waters are restricted to the traditio'n al three miles (pp. 160-161).
This last proviso of Professor Smith requires a brief discussion of the effect that the decision by the International Court of
Justice in the Fisheries case, reprinted, infra, in this volume,
and other current developments in national claims to more extensive internal and territorial waters, documented, infra, in this volume, will have on the problem raised by the Situation. The Fisheries decision, by expanding the area of internal waters in which
it has been customarily understood no right of innocent passage
exists, and the similar effect of certain national claims, will
restrict the sea space available to belligerent operations. It should
be noted that the Inter'national Law Commission in its final Report
on the Law of the Sea provided in Article 5, paragraph 3, that,
where straight base lines, newly established, enclose as internal
waters areas previously considered high or territorial seas, a
right of innocent passage through such waters should be preserved whenever such waters have normally been used for international traffic. Whether such an exception could now be implied through such waters for the "mere passage" provided by
Article X of Hague Convention XIII (1907) is very doubtful.
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To the degree the decision -a nd other recent claims have the consequence of extending the width of the territorial water belt itself,
it will both restrict the sea space available to belligerent operations and broaden the area in which "innocent passage" is permitted. Such an expansion will markedly increase the neutral's
task of surveillance and similarly enhance the probabilities of
belligerent abuse of the "mere passage" privilege. These considerations, in turn, accentuate the danger of counteraction by an
aggrieved belligerent.
In view of these probable consequences, an extensive broadening of the territorial sea will probably prove unacceptable to
belligerents and should give pause to neutrals themselves. It could
lead, on the one hand, to the increased insistence of belligerents
on the right of passage despite. the greater difficulties, and, on
the other hand, to greater likelihood that neutrals would follow a
policy of restricting or prohibiting innocent passage entirely. Such
a policy of exclusion, suggested previously, would only be acceptable to belligerents if the traditional limits of territorial waters
are maintained, as Professor Smith has indica ted.
Summary Conclusions

The Problem Situation and the Altmark case both suggest the
need for a more intensive study of t:he privilege of innocent
passage through neutral territorial waters by belligerent warships.
Whatever the differences of writers on the Altmark facts, it is
clear that the provisions permitting "mere passage" are ambiguous
and permit abuse, which in turn encourages the taking of forceful
counteraction by an aggrieved belligerent. This can only lead to a
breakdow·n in the maintenance of the rules of neutrality. To preserve the institution of neutrality, a tightening of the rule, or, preferably, a rule of complete exclusion, (if present territorial water
limits are maintained), would be desirable. The recent tendency
to make claims to more extended internal and territorial waters
makes the problem more urgent. Similarly, the development of
the means of modern warfare requires greater strictness in the
rule. Even under the existing rule, the use of an abnormal route
of long duration for a warlike "mission" is not for bona fide purposes of navigation and is prejudicial to the security interests of
the coastal state and to the interests of the opposing belligerent.
- Such use must therefore be regarded as a violation of the rule.
While the legality of the use of force in extreme situations must
be admitted, a strengthening of the rule would serve to lessen,
and, if possible, prohibit resort to such measures.
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Solution
(a) U has violated its duties as a neutral in permitting an
abusive use of its territorial waters that was not for bona fide
purposes of navigation and was prejudicial to the security interests of the coastal state and to the interests of the Defense Pact
as opposing belligerents. Such use is not the "mere passage"
authorized by Article X of Hague Convention XIII.
(b) While every breach of neutral duties does not authorize
forceful counteraction by an aggrieved belligerent, in the case
of such a grave violation as the instant Situation presents, the
Defense Pact States were legally entitled to use force to prevent
irremediable injury arising from U's breach of neutrality.
APPENDIX I TO SITUATION I
Correspondence between His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom and the Norwegian Government respecting the
German Steamer Altmark. (London, 17th February-15th March
1940. Norway No. 1 (1950), British Command Paper No. 8012.)
NOTE. This correspondence, taken from British Command Paper No. 8012,
printed in 1950, is reprinted below for convenient reference. The Document
( Cmd. 8012) is British Crown copyright, and permission to reprint in this
volun1e has been obtained from the Controller of Her Britannic Majesty's
Stationery Office through the courtesy of the British Foreign Office by a letter
to the Editor dated 26 September 1956. The early official statements by the
British, German, and Norwegian Governments have been available since 1941.
See Documents on International Affairs, Norway and the War (Royal
Institute of Intern&.tional Affairs, ( 1941), pp. 33-38).

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED I(INGDOM AND THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT RESPECTING THE GERMAN STEAMER "ALTMAR!("
London, 17th February-15th March, 1940
FOREWORD
The Altmark was, from the point of view of international law
and practice, of considerable importance as a legal precedent. The
incident has been dealt with by various distinguished publicists
on international law but because the full correspondence has never
been published they have not had all the necessary information
before them in order fully to appreciate it from the legal point of
view. Consequently, it is thought to be desirable, after consultation
with the Norwegian Government, to publish the texts of the exchanges of 'notes which took place between the two Governments
between 17th February and 15th March 1940.
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No. 1
Record of Conversation Between Viscount Halifax and Monsieur
Colban

Important
I asked the Norwegian Minister to call this afternoon and informed him that I thought his Government should be placed in
possession of certain facts already known to us in connection with
the liberation of the prisoners from the steamship Altmark.
2. The British authorities had been in touch with this ship
for some time. It was notorious that she had participated in the
depredations of the Graf Spee, to which she had been acting as
auxiliary. We had the best of reasons, confirmed by the British
subjects taken off the Graf Spee and previously imprisoned in the
Altmark, to believe that there were some three or four hundred
British subjects aboard who had been living for weeks under intolerable conditions. The Altmark was also credibly believed to
possess offensive armaments. The record of this ship must have
been well known to the Norwegian Government and in the view
of His Majesty's Government it was incumbent on the Norwegian
authorities, when she entered Bergen and requested passage
through Norwegian territorial waters, to subject her to a 1nost
careful search.
3. His Majesty's Government would be grateful for full particulars as to how this search was conducted and what facts were
discovered. Reports received by His Majesty's Government indicated that the examination had been perfunctory, and in any
case prisoners had not been discovered. On evidence received
hitherto, it appeared to His Majesty's Government that the Norwegian Government had failed in their duties as neutrals. It had
been suggested to me that the result of the examination would
have been such that the Nor"\vegian Government would have felt
obliged to release the prisoners. His Majesty's Government would
be glad to know what action the Norwegian authorities would
have taken if the prisoners had been found. Surely they would
either have released them or at any rate held them pending a full
examination of the position.
4. In brief, if no prisoners had been found when the ship was
boarded, the Norwegian Government would have had an excellent
ground for complaint. The prisoners, however, having been found,
His Majesty's Government considered that they had every right to
complain that the search carried out had been perfunctory.
5. The legal question, however, appeared to me of less im-

32
portance than the fact that three or four hundred British subjects
had been kept for many weeks in conditions in which no decent
person would have kept a dog. The fact that the Norwegian Government did not find a pretext to detain the ship or even to take
off the sick among the prisoners appeared to His Majesty's Government to give them good cause for complaint against the Norwegian
Government. In reply to an enquiry, I informed the Minister that
the action taken had been with the full assent of His Majesty's
Government. In view of the urgency, prior notification to the Nor~
wegian Government had not been possible. His Majesty's Government did not deny that Norwegian territorial waters had technically been infringed. They felt, however, that the case against
the German authorities was so overwhelming that they were
justified in pressing that the ship should be interned.
6. The Norwegian Minister stated that he had no information
regarding the search at Bergen, but that he would inform his
Government at once of what I had said and invite replies to the
various questions asked.
7. I then turned to the note which the Minister had handed
to me. 1 I observed that I took note of his Government's protest
and their reservation of rights, and would furnish a detailed reply
as soon as possible. I observed, however, that the Norwegian
Government would surely not seriously expect His Majesty's Government to return the prisoners; to which the Minister replied
that this was indeed their intention, as the only means of restoring
the case to a legal basis.
Foreign Office,
17th February, 19.40.

No.2
Monsieur Colhan to Viscount 1-Ialifax

Royal Norwegian Legation,
London, 17th February, 1940.

My Lord,
On the 16th February, 1940, in the afternoon the German
steamer Altmark was in Norwegian territorial waters, escorted
by a Norwegian torpedo-boat. At 4 :30 p.m. two British destroyers
fired shots of warning to stop the Altmark in the neighborhood of
the Foksteinene. The Norwegian torpedo-boat protested against
1
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this. The Altmark went in the Jossingfjord, and the destroyers
followed and remained at the entrance of the Fjord. The Norwegian torpedo-boat once more protested, and the English force,
which was then increased to one cruiser and five destroyers moved
outside the three nautical miles limit. 2 Some time later a destroyer
again entered Norwegian territorial waters and went close by land
and used searchlight. At 11 p.m. the English cruiser moved into
the Fjord and boarded the Altmark. A struggle followed, and it is
reported that several Germans were killed and wounded. It is
stated that about 400 British subjects on the Altmark were taken
on board the British ship which thereafter went out.
The Norwegian guard-ships consisted of two small tor pedoboats, and they could in face of the overwhelming British force
do nothing but protest with energy.
I have been instructed immediately to bring this to the Br itish
Government's notice and to lodge a serious protest against this
grave violation of Norwegian territorial waters, which has caused
s'trong indignation, as it took place in the interior of a Norwegian
Fjord, and thus cannot be due to any mistake or difference of
opinion with regard to the limit of the territorial waters.
The Norwegian Government must demand that the British Navy
be instructed in future to respect Norwegian Sovereignty.
The following is a translation of a note regarding Norwegian neutrality
which was addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Oslo by the Royal Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 4th September, 1939.
"Sir,
I have the honour to send you herewith a copy of the Royal Proclan1a tion
of the 3rd inst. on Norway's neutrality in the war between Great Britain and
France on the one side, and Germany on the other.
I have also the honour to inform you that it has been laid down by Royal
Resolution of the 3rd inst. that' (1) In the war which has broken out between foreign Powers, Norway
will maintain complete neutrality. The rules and regulations concerning neutrality which are in force (see the Royal Proclamation of 13th
May, 1938) will not be applied outside a distance of three nautical
miles from the coast.
(2) In every other respect the regulations regarding territorial water s,
hitherto in force, remain valid.'
This decision has been taken in order to avoid the difficulties which might
arise in consequence of doubt as to the extent of territorial waters. The decision is in conformity with the practice followed in the Great European W ar,
1914-18.
In requesting you to inform your Government of the above, I beg you to
accept the assurance of my highest consideration.
(Sd.) HALVDAN KoHT."
2
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The Norwegian Government expect of the British Government
that they will hand the prisoners over to the Norwegian Government and make due compensation and reparation.
I have, &c.
( Sd.) ERIK COLBAN.
No. 3
Monsieur Colhan to Viscount Halifax

Royal N orwegia11 Legation,
London, 24th February, 1940.
My Lord,
I have had the honour to give you to-day 3 verbal information
in answer to certain questions raised by you in the Altmark case,
and my Government hope thereby to have contributed to the
establishment of the real facts of the case and to have made clear
the view of the Norwegian Government on the matter.
My Government hope that the British Government, after what
has thus been stated, will feel themselves convinced that the Norwegian Government have acted in this case in strict accordance
with International Law.
If, however, the British Government should maintain their view,
the Norwegian Government would propose that the difference of
opinion between the two governments be submitted to arbitration,
in such a manner as might be laid down in a special agreement.
I have, &c.
(Sd.) ERIK COLBAN
No. 4
Aide-Memoire
(Left with Viscount Halifax by Monsieur Colban on
24 February 1940)

Royal Norwegian Legation.
The Altmark was visited by a Norwegian torpedo-boat in Norwegian territorial waters off Kristiansund the 14th February last.
It was then declared that the ship was on her way from a'n
American port (Port Arthur, Texas), to Germany and armed
with small anti-aircraft guns for her own defence, which guns
3

Document No. 4
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had been dismantled before arrival in the territorial waters. She
carried "Reichsdienstflagge" as a sign of her belonging to the
German State. In Sognesj oen the vessel was hailed by a torpedoboat and questions were asked, amongst these, whether persons
were on board, who belonged to the armed forces of a belligerent
country, or sailors domiciliated in or citizens of a belligerent
country. The answer was that no such person was on board. When
the Altmark was later on hailed by another Norwegian naval
vessel north of Bergen, the captain of the Altmark ref used his ship
to be searched. As the ship was an auxiliary naval vessel and thus
assimilated to a war vessel in respect of immunity, the Norwegian authorities had, in International Law, no power to proceed
to further inquires, nor to prevent the continuation of the voyage
in Norwegian territorial waters.
The Altmark did not call at Bergen or at any other Norwegian
port or anchorage, as seems to have been, erroneously, supposed.
No question of a 24 hours limit thus arises. Neither The Hague
Convention nor the Norwegian Neutrality Rules prescribe any
limited time in case of passage.
As the Altmark did not call at a Norwegian port, the Norwegian
Government had not had to decide what ought to have been done
with the ship or the prisoners, if that had been the case. Generally,
it can only be said that the Norwegian Government would also in
such a case have done their best to fulfill all their international
obligations.
The British Government have themselves emphasized the right
of vessels of war to passage in neutral territorial waters. Reference to this right was made in the memorandum presented to the
Norwegian Foreign Minister by the British Minister in Oslo on
the 23rd of May, 1939, to which memorandum the Norwegian
Foreign Minister replied on the 2nd September, 1939.
The Norwegian Government are desirous to underline that it
was their duty in this case correctly to observe the rules of International Law to both sides. And the Norwegian Government do
not have a'ny doubt as to the meaning of these rules.
As to the assertion that the British prisoners have been badly
treated, and that Norway ought to have considered the situation
from the humanitarian point of view, the Norwegian Government
would like to say that they can understand the feelings of the
· Brtish Government at the thought that British prisoners were on
board the Altmark. The Norwegian Government, however, consider that a neutral state cannot interfere between Belligerent
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Power s or in their disputes without definite authority for so doing
in a treaty or in some recognised rule of International Law.

No. 5
"Oral Communication" Made hy Monsieur Colhan on
8th March 1940

At the enquiry which has been made in Norway in the Alt1nark case, the following has been established:On t he 16th of February at 5 o'clock p.m., the Commander of
the Cossack informed the Commander of the Norwegian torpedoboat K iell that he was instructed by the British Admiralty to
liberate 400 British prisoners on board the Altmark. The Commander of the !{jell declared that he had no knowledge of the
presence of prisoners on board, and that his instructions were to
the effect that he should prevent violation of Norway's neutrality.
The Commander of the Cossack proposed inspection on the spot.
The Commander of the Kiell declined this and asked the British
Commander to leave Norwegian territorial waters at once.
At 11 p.m. on the same day, when the Cossack entered the
J ossingfj ord, her Commander replied to the Norwegian protest
that he had instructions from the British Government to liberate
the prisoners he had mentioned in the afternoon.
Apart from what is stated above, no request for joint Norwegian-British inspection was made, and no other declaration
was made on the Norwegian side as to the presence of prisoners
on board.
The Altmark used her wireless station illegally on the 15th
February at 1 :23 p.m. in a telegram to the German Legation in
Oslo. The telegram was stopped by the Norwegian authorities, and
the captain of the Altmark was at once informed that he had
violated the r egulations in force. He apologised.

No. 6
Viscount Halifax to Monsieur Colhan

4

Foreign Office, 15th March, 1940
Your Excellency,
On the 17th February last, I requested your Excellency t o call
upon me in order that I might give the Norwegian Government
This not e reached Oslo shortly before the Gern1an invasion of Norway
and, in that circumstance, the Norwegian Government were not in a position
to send a reply.
4
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certain facts which had already come to the know ledge of His
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in connexion with
the liberation of the British prisoners from the German naval
auxiliary vessel Altmark.
At that interview I explained the general attitude of His
Majesty's Government to the case as then known to them, and
I requested certain information as to the action taken by the
Norwegian Government and the results of that action. Your Excellency was good enough to undertake to obtain replies to the
various questions which I had put to you, and at the same time
handed me your note of the 17th February, in which the Norwegian Government lodged a serious protest against the grave
violation of Norwegian territorial waters which they considered
to have occurred, and stated that they expected His Majesty's
Government to hand the British prisoners over to the Norwegian
Government and make due compensation and reparation.
On the 24th February I had the honour to have a further interview with you, at which you were so good as to convey to me the
replies of your Government to the questions which I had put to
you on the 17th and handed to me your note No. 79 of the 24th
February, which stated that, in the light of the information given
in reply to my questions, the Norwegian Government hoped that
His Majesty's Government would feel convinced that the Norwegian Government had acted in this case in strict accordance
with international law, but that if His Majesty's Government
should maintain their view, the Norwegian Government would
propose that the difference of opinion between the two Governments should be submitted to arbitration. I now desire to make
the following observations on your Excellency's notes and on the
case in general.
2. The facts of the case as now known to His Majesty's Government, both from their own information and from the various
statements made by the Norwegian Government, are as follows.
The Altmark, a ship of about 18,000 tons gross, with a speed of
approximately 25 knots, is a German naval auxiliary vessel. She
appears in the 1939, official list of "Die Schiffe· der deutschen
Kriegsmarine," where she is described as a supply ship
("Trosschiff"). There is no doubt that she should be treated in
the same manner as a warship, and indeed the German official
wireless, despite the fact that it at first described her as an
."innocent merchant vessel," subsequently admitted that she was
being used as a naval auxiliary vessel.
3. The Altmark had been for a period of many weeks in
·attendance on the German armoured ship Admiral Graf Spee
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during the later's operations in the Atlantic and elsewhere, and
is known to have fuelled her at various times during that period.
In particular, the crews of a considerable number of British merchant ships sunk by the Adn~iral Graf Spee were placed by her
Commanding Officer on board the Altmark, and at the time of the
destruction of the Admiral Graf Spee the number of these prisoners amounted to about 300. After the destruction of the Admiral
Graf Spee, the Altmark left the South Atlantic and endeavoured
to return to Germany, the object of her voyage being clearly to complete the operation, which began with the capture of the
prisoners in question, by their removal to Germany as prisoners
of war. The prisoners were in charge of an armed guard composed
of seamen from the Admiral Graf Spee. The British naval authorities, who were aware of the Altmark's intended return to
Germany, had made the necessary dispositions to intercept her if
she came through the North Sea.
4. The Altn~ark, however, did not adopt this, the natural and
ordinary route for a ship returning to a German port from the
Atlantic. She entered Norwegian territorial waters on the 14th
February at some point off the Trondhj em Fjord, and proceeded
through those waters in a southerly direction. A little further
south she was stopped by a Norwegian torpedo-boat, whose Commander made a request to inspect the ship. It appears that as the
Altmark was regarded as a warship and carried the German State
flag, the Norwegian officers considered that the only thing he was
entitled to do was to ascertain that the ship really was what she
purported to be. He examined her papers, which are stated to have
been in order, and was informed that the ship was on her way
from Po.rt Arthur, Texas, to Germany and that she carried antiaircraft guns for her own defence.
The Altmark proceeded on her way, but further south at
Sognesj oen she was hailed by another Norwegian torpedo-boat
and was asked whether there were any persons on board who
belonged to the armed forces of a belligerent country, or sailors
domiciled in, or citizens of, a belligerent country. The answer was
that no such person was on board. The ship was again allowed to
proceed, but it appears that the Admiral Commanding at Bergen
was not satisfied about her, and on the 15th February, when the
Altmark was about 100 miles from Bergen, a Norwegian guard '
ship stopped her and asked to inspect her. This the Altmark's
captain refused to allow, and the request was dropped. It was
then discovered that the Altmark had been using her wireless
in Norwegian territorial waters in contravention of the Norwegian
neutrality regulations, and a complaint of this was made by the ,
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Norwegian authorities; the captain made an apology, declaring
that he was unacquainted with this prohibition, and the matter
vvas apparently not pursued further.
5. The Norwegian Government state that the Altmark did not
. call at Bergen or any other Norwegian port, and His Majesty's
Government naturally accept this statement. There is, however,
no doubt that she passed through the "Bergen defended area," a
zone about 20 miles long from north to south, -vvhich constitutes
one of the Norwegian "ports et espaces maritimes qui auront ete
declares ports de guerre" which belligerent warships are forbidden
to enter under Article 2 of the Norwegian Neutrality Regulations.
Inasmuch as such a violation of their Regulations obviously could
not have escaped the vigilance of the Norwegian authorities, His
Majesty's Government assume that special permission was given
by them to the Altmark to pass through the area in question,
although the Regulations make no provision for any exceptions to
this prohibition. As to the grounds on which such permission was
requested and the reasons which led the Norwegia'n Government
to grant it, His Majesty's Government have no information; but
they have no doubt as to the motives which led the ship to desire
to pass through the area, and I shall return to this point later.
6. The Altmark continued on her voyage south through Norwegian territorial waters, apparently escorted by a Norwegian
torpedo-boat, and on the 16th February she was finally encountered
by H.M.S. Cossack in the Jossingfjord in the circumstances with
which the Norwegian Government are acquainted. The Commanding Officer of H.M.S. Cossack had been instructed by the British
Admiralty to propose to the Commander of the Norwegian torpedo-boat that a joint Anglo-Norwegian guard should be placed
on board the Altmark a'n d a joint Anglo-Norwegian escort provided to accompany her to Bergen in order that the matter might
be properly investigated there by the Norwegian authorities. The
Commanding Officer of H.M.S. Cossack has reported that he
carried out these instructions, but that his proposal was declined
by the Norwegian Commander in accordance, as he stated, with
the instructions of his Government. The Commanding Officer of
H.M.S. Cossack then invited the Norwegian Commander to accompany the British boarding party during their impending search of
the Altm.ark, but he declined to do so.
Your Excellency has informed me that, according to the in.formation in possession of your Government, the Commanding
Officer of H.M.S. Cossack proposed inspection on the spot but that,
apart from this, no request for joint Norwegian-British inspection
was made. It is possible that some confusion may have arisen be-
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tween inspection at Bergen and inspection on the spot, but His
Majesty's Government have no doubt, in view of the specific instructions which they had issued, and the reports which they had
received, that both proposals were, in fact, made by the Commanding Officer of H.M.S. Cossack. It is in any case clear, on your Excellency's statement, that an offer of joint inspection was made
and was declined by the Norwegian Commander.
The Altmark was then boarded and the British prisoners released and taken on board H.M.S. Cossack. The Altn~ark hadpreviously attempted to ram H.M.S. Cossack and drive her ashore
and resistance was offered to the boarding party by the German
armed guard, the first shot being fired at a British warrant officer,
who was wounded by it. There was some loss of life on the German
side, but no injury to Norwegian life or property took place. I
desire to add that at that point the Altmark had passed through
some 400 miles of Norwegian territorial waters from the point
at which she entered them, and the total length of those waters
which she would in all probability have traversed if her voyage
had not been interrupted is over 600 miles.
7. Such being the circumstances of the case, His Majesty's Government consider that it was the duty of the Norwegian Government, before allowing the Altmark to continue her voyage through
Norwegian territorial waters, and particularly before granting her
permission to pass through the "Bergen defended area," to ascertain by means of a proper investigation not only the status of the
ship but also the nature and object of her voyage and of the use
to which she was putting those waters. It is clear that the Norwegian Government failed to do so. On at least three occasions the
Altmark was stopped by a Norwegian warship and there was
ample opportunity for such an investigation, but none was made,
and the proposals for investigation made by H.M.S. Cossack were
refused. In consequence, the Norwegian Government were, according to their own statement, unaware throughout of the material
fact that the Altmark had about 300 British prisoners on board.
In this connexion His Majesty's Government attach particular
importance to the incident at Sognesjoen, when a Norwegian
torpedo-boat specifically enquired whether the Altmark had on
board any sailors who were citizens of a belligerent country, and
was answered in the negative. This indicates that the Commander
of the Norwegian torpedo-boat had some suspicions as to the true
position; but the really important consideration is that the fact
of the Commander of the Altmark having found it necessary to
reply to the enquiry by a barefaced lie shows that he at any rate
considered the presence of the British prisoners on board to be so

f
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material a circumstance that it was essential to keep it from
coming to the knowledge of the Norwegian authorities, even at
the sacrifice of his personal honour. He obviously felt that if this
circumstance came to the knowledge of the Norwegian authorities,
his purpose in using the protection of hundreds of miles of Norwegian territorial waters to ensure the safe conveyance of the
prisoners to Germany would be frustrated. It is, in fact, clear that
both the Norwegian Commander and the German Commander
regarded the presence or absence of prisoners as a relevant circumstance. The fact that the question was asked and that it was
untruthfully answered seems to indicate that both Commanders
took the same view as His Majesty's Government, indicated in
paragraphs 14 to 16 of this note, of the application of Article 10
of The Hague Convention No. XIII, 5 to the use being made by the
Altmark of Norwegian territorial waters.
The attempts of the Norwegian officers to make a proper investigation of the case were met by refusals to allow the ship to be
examined, backed by a deliberate lie, and no proper investigation,
which would have_ immediately revealed the true situation, took
place at all.
8. The Norwegian Government seem to regard this result as
inevitable. They appear to take the view that once the Altmark
had been acknowledged as bearing the character of a warship, they
had no right to make any investigation of the nature and object
of her voyage and use of Norwegian waters, and were only entitled
to look at her papers. His Majesty's Government cannot accept
any such view. If a belligerent warship proposes to make use of
neutral ports or territorial waters, the neutral Government has
not only the right but a definite obligation to make such investigation as may be required in order to satisfy itself that the use in
question is proper and permissible under international law; and if
the warship declines to submit to such investigation, such a refusal
(which inevitably suggests that the vessel's proceedings and purpose would not stand investigation) should be met by at least a
refusal to allow her to continue to use the shelter of neutrality for
her purpose. Any other view would open the door to wholesale
infractions of neutral rights and obligations. While a neutral State
cannot be expected to do more than employ the means at its disposal for the purpose of such investigation, in this case, those
means, although amply sufficient, were not in fact employed. His
Majesty's Government cannot but conclude that the action of the
Norwegian Government in allowing their attempts at investiga5
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tion to be frustrated as they were, and permitting the Altmark to
proceed as she did, constituted a failure to comply with the
obligations of neutrality.
9. There are, moreover, two particular incidents to which His
Majesty's Government feel bound to call attention. The first is the
discovery that the Altmark had been violating the Norwegian
Regulations by using her wireless in Norwegian waters. His
Majesty's Government consider that when this discovery had been
made, it was incumbent upon the Norwegian authorities at least to_
ascertain the nature of the use which the Altmark had been
making of her wireless, since the nature of the communications
might well have been such as to constitute not merely a breach
of the Norwegian Regulations forbidding any transmission at all,
but a serious infringement of neutrality which would have called
for appropriate action by the Norwegian Government. But no
such investigation was made, and the matter was regarded as disposed of by the apology made by the Altrnark's Commander. 6
10. The second incident is the permission which must be presumed to have been given to the Altmark to pass through the
"Bergen defended area." There can be no doubt that the request
was made because, while it is possible to avoid the area without
leaving territorial waters, the passage in question is, in certain
conditions, a dangerous one, and the Altmark might have been ·
obliged to leave territorial waters and enter the open sea, in
which case she would have been exposed to attack by British
forces. It was in order to avoid any such possibility that the
Altmark desired to pass through an area which is prohibited by
the Norwegian Regulations to belligerent warships, and His

1

It has since been learned that the telegram addressed to the German
Legation in Oslo was at once intercepted by the Norwgian authorities, who
therefore knew its contents. It was worded as follows:"W erde soeben 1300 Uhr zum zweiten Male vom N orwegischen
Zerstorer (n) zum Stoppen aufgefordert, nachdem bereits in drei
Fallen N orwegischen Offizieren aile erbetene Auskunft erteilt
worden ist. Muss gegen diese meines Erachtens neutralitatswidrige
wiederholte Verzogerung energischen Protest erheben."
6

[Translation]
"Have just been ordered to stop for the second time, at 1300 hours,
by a Norwegian destroyer, after Norwegian officers already on three
occasions have been given all the information they requested. Must
protest energetically against this repeated delay which in my opinion
is a breach of neutrality."
This is the telegram which was intercepted by the Norwegian authorities- ·.
see last paragraph of Docu1nent No. 5.
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Majesty's Government cannot but regard the action of the Norwegian Government in granting permission as singularly difficult
to justify in the circumstances.
11. For the above reasons His Majesty's Government co·n sider
that, irrespective of the question whether the nature and object of
the Alhnark's voyage through Norwegian territorial waters were
permissible, the fact that the Norwegian authorities permitted,
and, indeed, went out of their way to facilitate, that voyage without making any proper enquiry into its nature and object constituted a definite failure on their part to comply with the obligations of neutrality. It had become plain that, so far as the Norwegian Government were concerned, the Altmark would be allowed
to effect her object of conveying the British prisoners to Germany
through the shelter of Norwegian territorial waters, and His
Majesty's Government consider, therefore, that in the circumstances they were fully justified in taking action to prevent that
result being achieved, and that they would, indeed, have failed
in their duty if they had not done so. I desire to emphasize that
the action of His l\1aj esty's ships was confined to the minimum
necessary to secure the release of the prisoners ; despite the
resistance offered, no attempt was made to capture or destroy the
Altmark, or to make prisoners of the armed guard or crew.
12. Quite apart from the questions whether the Norwegian
Government exercised toward the Altmark the vigilance which was
properly required of them as neutrals, His Majesty's Government
desire to deal fully with other aspects of the case. It will be
recalled that His Excellency the Norwegian Minister for Foreign
Affairs explained in the Storting on the 19th February that, in the
vievv of the Norwegian Government, the Altmark in any case had
the right to pass through Norwegian territorial waters; and he
also stated that "there is nothing in international law prohibiting
a belligerent from conveying prisoners through neutral territory
if the passage itself is legal"; and I assume, therefore, that this
represents the attitude of the Norwegian Government on the
question of international law involved.
13. To take the latter statement first, and assuming that the
word ''territory" is to be regarded as meaning "territorial waters"
and not as including land, His Majesty's Government have never
contended, and do not now contend, that in all circumstances the
presence of prisoners on board a belligerent warship, which is
legitimately visiting neutral jurisdiction, imposes on the ·neutral
the duty of taking action such as the release of the prisoners~
If a belligerent warship, paying a legitimate visit of not more than
24 hours to a neutral port, has prisoners on board, this does not
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in itself impose any obligation upon the neutral Government. If,
however, the warship requires special facilities in the neutral port,
such as repairs which cannot be executed within 24 hours, different
considerations arise, as is shown by the fact that, after the arrival
of the Admiral Graf Spee, at Montevideo, the Uruguayan Government effected the release of the prisoners (shipmates of those in
the Altmark) who were o·n board her. The question is one which
must depend on the facts of the particular case, or, in the words
of Professor Koht, on the question whether "the passage itself is
legal."
14. The Norwegian Government contend that the passage of
the Alt1nark, in the circumstances stated above, through hundreds
of miles of Norwegian territorial waters was a legitimate operation which they were bound to allow. They consider, in fact, that
it was an instance of "the mere passage" ("le simple passage") ;
through neutral territorial waters which, under Article 10 of The :
Hague Convention XIII, does not compromise t he neutrality of
the country concerned. From this view His Majesty's Government ~
must emphatically dissent. They have frequently in the past in- ·
sisted on the "right of innocent passage," and they were them- ·
selves the authors, at The Hague Conference of 1907, of the
proposal which ultimately took the form of Article 10. But it is .
an essential element of innocent passage that it should be innocent~ ~
and their attitude on this point was expressed by Sir Ernest Satow,
the first British delegate at The Hague Conference, when he spoke
of "la liberte de traverser en temps de guerre comme en temps de
paix les eaux territoriales." ('Innocent passage," which it was the
object of Article 10 to allow, means passage through such territorial waters as would form part of a ship's normal course from
the point of departure to her destination, and in particular through
such territorial waters as form part of straits which provide access
from one area of the sea to another. It is in this sense that His
Majesty's Government have always understood and upheld the
"right of innocent passage," and it is in this sense that it is
recognised in international law. To regard it otherwise would
clearly be to encourage the abuse of neutral jurisdiction. His ·
Majesty's Government accordingly consider that for the reasons ;
given in paragraph 8 above, it is the duty of a neutral, before ·
exercising the liberty which Article 10 allows to permit "le simple ;
passage," to satisfy itself that the passage is in fact of such a ;
nature as to be permissible u·n der that Article.
15. But what was the nature and object of the Altmark's ·'
passage through Norwegian territorial waters? She was on her :
way from the South Atlantic to Germany by the nor th-about .
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route, and the object of her journey and of her passage through
Norwegian waters was to complete with impunity the belligerent
operation, which began with the capture of the British seamen
and was continued with their conveyance across the Atlantic, by
depositing them in Germany as prisoners of war. She had entered
Norwegian territorial waters on the 14th February at a point off
the Trondhjem Fjord, and on the 16th February she had proceeded
through those waters for about 400 miles, and was in all probability proposing to continue her passage through those waters
until she reached their southerly limit, more than 200 miles
further on. The Norwegian Government will not suggest that the
circuitous route taken by the Altmark bears any relation whatever
to the course normally adopted by shipping proceeding from the
Atlantic north-about to Germany. The sole and the admitted
object with which the Altmark took this highly remarkable course
was to conclude her warlike operations under the protection of
Norwegian neutrality for a distance of several hundred miles and
a period of more than three days, so as to escape the fate which
awaited her on the high seas at the hands of the British Fleet;
and the importance which she attached to not leaving for one
moment the shelter of those waters is illustrated by the incident
of her passage through the Bergen defended area.
16. His Majesty's Government most emphatically insist that
such a voyage cannot be regarded as one which the Altmark was
entitled to make, or the Norwegian Government bound to permit,
as being an instance of the right of innocent passage which is
recognised by international law and permitted under the title of
"le simple passage" by Article 10 of The Hague Convention XIII.
It could not even be accurately described as an abuse of that right
to which it bears no relation whatever. It involves a claim by
Germany (who has not scrupled to violate Norwegian neutrality
when it suited her purpose to do so) to utilise the entire length of
Norwegian territorial waters as and when she pleases, not in the
ordinary course of navigation, but as a sort of protected corridor
within the shelter of which her warships can complete, under the
protection of Norwegian neutrality, the military operations in
which they may have been engaged. This is not a claim which
Germany is entitled to make or Norway to concede.
17. Your Excellency stated to me that as the Altmark did not
call at Bergen or at any other Norwegian port or anchorage, no
question of a 24 hours' limit arises. This as it stands cannot be
regarded as a correct statement of the law, since Article 12 of
The Hague Convention XIII expressly for bids belligerent warships
~~de demeurer dans les ports et rades ou dans les eaux territoriales"
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of a neutral Power for more than 24 hours. His Majesty's Government regard the question of passage through territorial waters as
governed by Article 10 of the Convention and not by Article 12,
and, in their view, the time limit of passage is not the fixed one
of 24 hours prescribed by the latter Article but that which results
from the very nature of "innocent passage" which I have described
in paragraph 14 of the present Note; but Article 12 is at any rate
a refutation of the contention that no time limit exists if the ship
does not enter a port or anchorage, and the existence of this gen..:
eral prohibition, applicable to both ports and territorial waters,
reinforces the view which His Majesty's Government hold as to
the nature of the passage which is permitted by Article 10.
18. In this connexion there is one point to which I feel it neces- ·
sary to refer. On the 19th February His Excellency the Norwegian
Minister for Foreign Affairs made a statement in the course of i
which he said that in the summer of 1939 His Majesty's Government, in making certain enquiries of the Norwegian Government
as to the Neutrality Regulations which they had adopted, had
emphasized "that warships must have the right to sail in Norwegian territorial waters as long as they desired and without
regard to the twenty-four hours' limit." His Majesty's Government are constrained to observe that there is no foundation for
this statement. What His Majesty's Government did say, in their
memorandum of 23rd May, 1939, was that "they have always
maintained, and must continue to maintain, the existence of such
a right of entry (i.e., into neutral territorial waters) for purposes of innocent passage." The object of this observation (which
was correctly quoted in the statement issued by the Norwegian
Foreign Department on the 21st February) was, of course, to
maintain the principle of the right of innocent passage to which
His Majesty's Government have always attached importance, and
on which His Majesty's Government felt that some doubt might
possibly be cast by certain provisions of the Norwegian Regulations. I readily accept the statement which your Excellency made
to me on the 24th February, that Professor l(oht's statement was
due to his having relied upon his recollection of the contents of
His Majesty's Government's memorandum; but as the statement,
which was publicly attributed to His Majesty's Government, was
never made by them, and never could have been made by them,
since it would have been in direct contradiction of their views as
to the right of innocent passage, I think it desirable that the true 1
facts should be placed on record.
19. His Majesty's Government must, therefore, conclude that
the use made by the Altmark of Norwegian territorial waters was
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not a legitimate exercise of the right of innocent passage, and
ought not to have been permitted by the Norwegian Government;
and that the action of the Norwegian Government in permitting, and, indeed, facilitating, the Altmark's operations, and in
making no proper enquiry as to the nature and object of those
operations, constituted a failure to observe the obligations of
neutrality. In the light of the facts and the above considerations,
His Majesty's Government feel that they were fully justified in
taking the action which in the circumstances they felt compelled
to take. I desire to add that while in the above observations I have
made no reference to the considerations arising from Norway's
membership of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government
reserve their position in this respect.
20. But I do not wish, particularly in view of the friendly
relations which have existed for so long between our two seafaring nations, to conclude upon this note. In your communication
of the 24th February your Excellency suggested that the difference
of opinion between the two Governments might be submitted to
arbitration. Should the Norwegian Government feel it necessary
to persist in this suggestion, His Majesty's Government would
have several observations to make which appear to them to be
extremely pertinent. But I venture to hope that, in view of the
very full explanation which I have now given of the attitude of
His Majesty's Government, the Norwegian Government will not
find it necessary to press this suggestion further. I have thought
it only proper to state the reasons which lead His Majesty's Government to consider that they have just cause of complaint against
the Norwegian Government; but I fully recognise that your Excellency's Government found themselves in a difficult position, and I
readily acknowledge, in particular, that they could not have been
expected to assume that legitimate enquiries made on their behalf
would have been met by shameless mendacity on the part of the
German officer concerned. His Majesty's Government have warmly
appreciated the fact that the Norwegian Government should have
expressed understanding of the feelings of His Majesty's Government at the thought that British prisoners were ·on board the
Altmark; and His Majesty's Government for their part are very
willing to place on record their regret that they should have had
no option but to adopt a course which, although in their opinion
fully justified by the circumstances, admittedly involved taking
action in Norwegian territorial waters.
21. This being so, I venture to hope that the Norwegian Government, even if they are unable to accept all the contentions which
I have put forward, will at any rate be ·n ot unwilling to recognise

48

that this case constitutes a clash not of right and wrong but of
two rights; and that they 'vill feel able to agree that, each party
having now expressed its point of view, the matter can be allowed
to rest where it is without disturbing the traditionally friendly
relations between our two countries.
I have, &c.
(Sd.) HALIFAX

